A Century of Arab Politics by Maddy-Weitzman Bruce

Author:Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: undefined
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
Published: 2012-07-16T16:00:00+00:00

A New Arab Order?

The crushing defeat of Iraq and the imposition of strict UN-mandated sanctions against Saddam Husayn’s regime neutralized Iraq’s ability to be a serious actor in Arab politics. The victorious Six Plus Two coalition (the Saudi-led GCC states, Egypt, and Syria) could now, in theory, fashion an Arab order according to a common vision, without encountering significant resistance.

On March 5, 1991, they attempted to do just that. Meeting in Damascus, the foreign ministers of the Six Plus Two group moved to institutionalize their wartime alliance and thus defy the legacy of past failures in forging durable multilateral frameworks. To that end, they issued the “Damascus Declaration,” spelling out their vision of the postwar Arab and regional order. Not surprisingly, it was to be based on the principles embodied in the UN and Arab League charters, emphasizing respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state, nonintervention in another country’s domestic affairs, and a commitment to settle disputes by peaceful means. Reflecting the imminent economic union among European Community countries, one of the declaration’s objectives was the establishment of an Arab economic grouping. More immediately, the GCC states reportedly pledged $5 billion in economic assistance to Egypt and Syria, with more to come.

The declaration’s security component was significant. Egypt’s and Syria’s participation in the anti-Saddam coalition was not considered to be a one-time event. Rather, the two countries’ presence in the Gulf was defined as “a nucleus for an Arab peace force” that would safeguard the security of the Gulf Arab states.[17] The declaration’s principles were implicitly endorsed by the United States at a joint meeting of the Six Plus Two foreign ministers with US Secretary of State James Baker on March 10. The group’s willingness to advertise its pro-American tilt was unprecedented in modern Arab history, and a sign of the times.

By May 1991, however, it was clear that a multilateral Arab military force in the Gulf was not going to be established, as Egypt began withdrawing its troops, and Syria followed suit. A revised Damascus Declaration, issued on July 16, made no mention of the force. What had happened? At bottom, the failure to implement the original plan was political: the Gulf states had preferred to resume their traditional balancing act between stronger regional powers—in this case, between Egypt and Iran, which had objected to the whole notion of an US-endorsed exclusively Arab Gulf security plan. For the Gulf states, there was actually little value to having standing Arab forces on their territory. During the crisis, their presence had had important symbolic value, but now that it was over, considerations of realpolitik took precedence. In addition, their aversion to the stationing of Egyptian and Syrian forces in their territories also reflected a lingering wariness of more powerful Arab states. Egypt, for its part, while angry about Iran’s interference and the GCC’s perceived ingratitude, quickly understood the signals emanating from the Gulf and preempted what would be an embarrassing request for the withdrawal of its troops. For

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